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Social contractThis article proposes a framework for studying the social contract along the four parameters (4Ps) of pro-
tection, provision, participation and the production of hegemony. To appreciate the differentiated expe-
rience of how these parameters are lived, this framework is applied to schools as arenas that uniquely
capture the dynamics of power and legitimacy in society. The education sector reflects broader transfor-
mations in the state bureaucracy, in social policy and in the lived experience of key elements of the social
contract from the rule of law and gendered violence to formal and informal privatization, everyday forms
of participation and the narratives and practices around nationalism and neoliberalism that legitimize
these changes. Applying this approach to the case study of Egypt updates earlier propositions about an
Arab social contract and nuances the notion of a tradeoff between provision and participation rights in
understanding regime legitimacy. It underlines the critical changes to protection and legitimation over
the past decades and the implications of the outsourcing of various elements of the social contract to
market, charitable and religious forces. Drawing on rare research inside schools catering to different
social classes before and after the 2011 uprising, the article describes how their realities reflect the trans-
formations of lived citizenship in this historical juncture. Egyptian schools reveal a ‘lived social contract’
that is underpinned by selective retraction of protection, a collapse of provision, impoverishment and
Islamization of participation and a resulting disengagement from the production of hegemony.
 2020 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Major philosophers including Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have
used the concept of the social contract to understand the develop-
ment and legitimacy of the state. One of the most famous applica-
tions of the concept in political science refers to welfarist
authoritarian Arab regimes (Loewe, Zintl, & Houdret, 2020). The
central premise of conceptions of an Arab social contract is that
stability and the authoritarian durability in Arab countries have
been predicated on an arrangement whereby a set of economic
and social rights are distributed to citizens in exchange for accept-
ing limited political representation (Heydemann, 2007;
Hinnebusch, 2006; Ianchovichina, Mottaghi, & Devarajan, 2015).
These treatments of the social contract therefore imply a tradeoff
between social and political rights, or an ‘authoritarian bargain’where citizens are denied effective representation but granted con-
siderable welfare benefits; a pattern especially relevant to state-
socialist and oil-rich states across the global South (Desai,
Olofsgård, & Yousef, 2009). The authoritarian bargain can be seen
as paralleling arguments about rentier states; where instead of
the state taxing citizens who then demand political rights, (oil)
rents are used to provide social rights while political rights are
denied; and the famous axiom is reversed: no representation with-
out taxation.1 Beyond oil-rich states, it is a pattern that has also been
critical in the experience of European fascism. For the Arab region,
the turn to neoliberal policies and the subsequent failure of many
states to fulfill their part of this contract has therefore been seen
by many authors as a strong contributor to the Arab Uprisings that
took off in 2011 (see, e.g.; Hanieh, 2013; Joya, 2011; Kaboub,
2013; Mitchell, 2012; Roccu, 2013). Some regimes had however
attempted to balance this withdrawal of provision with limited
forms of political inclusion, but in some cases, this seemed tos://doi.
3 I conducted research in one girls’ and one boys’ technical school, one girls’ and
one boys’ general and one girls’ and one mixed private schools. 56% of secondary
students were enrolled in the technical track, 33% in the general track, 3% in private
schools, while 8% enrolled in the religious Azhar track (MOE, 2007, Annex2, 77). My
pre-2011 ethnographic research inside schools amounted to about 480 h and 149
2 H. Sobhy /World Development xxx (xxxx) xxxstrengthen protest movement (Egypt) while in others it did not
(Morocco).
There are a number of analytical costs for thinking about social
contracts in terms of a tradeoff between socioeconomic and polit-
ical rights. First, focusing on social and political rights ignores a
wide array of critical issues relating to the reach of the rule of
law and the prevalence corruption; which appeared very promi-
nently in the Arab uprisings. Second, focusing on the repression
of political challenges to the regime does not give adequate atten-
tion to the reach of other forms of repression into the daily lives of
different sectors of the population, also fueling their grievances.
Third, macro level treatments of economic and political rights do
not allow for a systematic study of how these realities and narra-
tives are lived and how they shape everyday experiences of citi-
zens. Fourth, focusing on provision and participation does not
give sufficient attention to the discourses, values and identities
promoted to legitimize the economic and political order, nor to
how they are reproduced, contested or ignored by citizens. Even
without considerable retraction of social rights, regime legitimacy
could be severely shaken by a blatant failure to fulfill the obligation
of protecting national security (like losing territory in a war).
Fourth, the other part of the bargain of the social contract is not
only that citizens refrain from challenging the regime, but also
involves the income, time and labor they are required to provide
in return for belonging to the polity. Adequate attention to this
dimension requires a tracking not only of the tax burden and its
distribution, but also of other critical citizen obligations like com-
pulsory military service. Finally, even if the tradeoff holds, its
implications for dynamic situations are unclear. That is, even if
the provision of social rights had render blocked participation
more palatable and even if vast external rents impede participatory
accountability, this does not tell us what happens when social
rights are retracted. Therefore, before addressing such dynamic
questions around the social contract, more systematic theorization
is needed to include the other two parameters of protection and
legitimation and the dimension of lived experience.
The aim therefore is not to introduce hitherto unexplored fac-
tors, but rather to theorize a number of elements into an integrated
framework that addresses overall trends and that can be applied to
everyday lived realities.2 While the article applies the framework to
a case study in the Arab region, the various analytical tools stem-
ming from the literature on social contracts, citizenship and hege-
mony are applicable to any political system. Using the lens of
education is also applicable to most modern societies. As Bourdieu
put it, ‘‘the sociology of education lies at the foundation of a general
anthropology of power and legitimacy” (1996, 5). The methodologies
and categories he applied in studying French education have been
refined and applied to other contexts in the global North and South.
This article builds on this literature by charting a new course within
the anthropology of education that provides a systematic explo-
ration of lived social contracts; bringing both citizenship studies
and the anthropology of education closer to larger political concerns.
In developing and applying the 4Ps Framework, the article
brings together a wide range of secondary and primary data. In
terms of primary research, it builds on unique ethnographic
research in secondary schools (grades 10–12) in the Greater Cairo
area and analysis of official textbooks. Since 2008, I spent close to
500 hours inside six schools catering to boys and girls from differ-2 To go back to the Arab region, various scholars have analyzed the importance of
ideological or nationalist factors. In relation to social contracts, Hinnebusch (2015,
2006) theorized the important distinction between Populist Authoritarian and Rentier
Monarchy. Various scholars have also theorized legitimacy and legitimation under
authoritarian regimes (see Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004). Others have made the
link between corruption and the uprisings, although the focus here is on a wider
notion of protection under the law that impacts various facets of everyday experience.
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schools, and analyzed nationally unified textbooks in all citizen-
ship related subjects from the late Mubarak era to the present.3 I
can only cover here a slim portion of the rich ethnographic data I
analyze more fully elsewhere (Sobhy, forthcoming). In the following
section, I lay out the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the
4Ps Framework. I then explain the underpinnings of the methodol-
ogy of reading lived social contract through education. The third sec-
tion briefly sketches the background to the case study by describing
the overall parameters of the 4Ps in Egypt. The subsequent sections
are organized around each of the four parameters of the social con-
tract. Each section explains how these overall trends are manifested
and illuminated by everyday realities experienced by the nation’s
youth in schools. The conclusion brings together the overall findings
and arguments.
2. The 4Ps framework for studying social contracts
Major philosophers from Hobbes and Locke to Kant and Rawls
have used the notion of the social contract as a means to under-
stand the development and legitimacy of the state. Social contract
theory is essentially concerned with public justification, i.e., ‘‘of
determining whether or not a given regime is legitimate and there-
fore worthy of loyalty” (D’Agostino, 1996, 23). It aims to show that
members of some society have reason to endorse and comply with
the fundamental social rules, laws, institutions, and/or principles of
that society (D’Agostino, Gaus, & Thrasher, 2019). In the most basic
sense, the social contract can be understood as the de-facto
arrangement whereby the state guarantees security, order and
the rule of law and citizens must in turn surrender their rights
and obey its dictates. Tax payment, military service and enrolling
children to state approved schools are some of the key obligations
of citizens under modern social contracts. These elements are often
spelled out in legal documents. Constitutions are codifications of
the social contract, where basic rights and duties as well as param-
eters of national identity and common values are spelled out. Mod-
ern states are also widely expected to provide political rights and
to make sound economic decisions. The state’s role in safeguarding
and promoting citizen welfare is also often explicitly stipulated in
constitutions as well as reference to the dominant economic ideol-
ogy. Because the explicit and implicit rights of individuals vis-a-vis
the state are central to the social contract, the concept is rather clo-
sely linked to concepts of citizenship. However, while citizenship
rights are central to modern social contracts, the idea of a contract
pushes us to think in terms of the expected obligations of each
party under the contract.
In order to analyze these state and citizen obligations, the arti-
cle proposes a framework that builds on citizenship categories but
adapts them to the broader lens of the social contract. The litera-
ture on citizenship has categorized rights into different clusters
and categories, including the famous Marshallian classification ofinterviews with 6 school principals, 34 teachers and 109 students, combined with
interviews with teachers and students from other schools across the city. I carried out
most of the post-2011 interviews from 2016 to 2018 with 40 students and teachers
from 12 different schools in Greater Cairo and 15 stakeholders; including researchers,
members of textbook committees, journalists, teacher syndicate leaders and practi-
tioners in NGOs and donor agencies. I analyzed the 2009/2010 textbooks for the three
years of secondary education in all tracks and specializations, and reviewed the
relevant changes in textbooks for the subsequent years until 2016/2017. I focused
particularly on the key subjects of National Education (Civics) and Arabic Language,
while also analyzing History and Religious Studies textbooks.
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proposed here uses the alternative labels of protection, provision
and participation, or the 3Ps to refer to the three primary obliga-
tions of the state.4 This usage builds on the commonly used classifi-
cations of rights, but introduces critical modifications to
accommodate elements critical for legitimacy as well as everyday
lived experiences. First, under the social contract, the state’s role in
protection includes establishing and maintaining the rule of law
emphasized in the Marshallian notion of civil rights, but also
includes other fundamental forms of protection. If the original idea
of the social contract was that states provide security, law and order
in return for obedience of its dictates, then the category of protection
aims to capture this central parameter of law and order as well
responsibility to protect national security. These two primary roles
of the state are almost always explicitly enshrined in constitutions
and therefore unequivocally part of the social contract. Despite the
complexity of defining national security, it is impossible to address
legitimacy in a model that does not take into account major changes
affecting this basic function of the state. This expanded notion of
protection enables this framework to systematically address issues
that touch on the rule of law like elite and petty corruption, those
that relate to equality before the law like classed and gendered
access to state protection, as well as those that relate to protection
frommajor national threats like the failure to protect borders or con-
tain insurgencies. These elements are critical for the lens of the social
contract because perceptions of how well the state performs its role
on these fronts are critical for legitimacy. This notion of protection
therefore brings together issues around domestic legal protection
and protection from major foreign, insurgent or environmental
threats. Citizen have the corresponding obligations to abide by the
law and oftentimes to perform military service, which can shape
the lives of men and women across generations.
The second cluster of obligations relates to provision and refers
to the welfare payments, goods, services and opportunities pro-
vided by the state. This includes social rights, but is expanded to
accommodate the normative expectations that modern states
make sound economic decisions that maintain or expand citizen
welfare. Social rights refer to the wide range of transfer payments
and public good and services financed by the state, whereby it
replaces the market as a distributive mechanism (Stephens,
2010). Such payments and services can be provided to all citizens,
like education, or only to those deemed to be entitled to state sup-
port, like welfare payments to citizens falling below a certain
income level. Measures of sound economic management abound
and so do disagreements about them, but the focus in building a
broad image of legitimacy is on major trends and shifts in the ele-
ments that affect the everyday lives of citizens and their standards
of living; as typically reflected in measures of unemployment,
income distribution and inflation. The obligations of citizens in
relation to provision refer to their various legally mandated mate-
rial contributions (taxes for short) as well as their labor and time
contributions. The third cluster of roles refers to different forms
of civic and political participation. The role of the state in relation
to participation includes guaranteeing political rights; including
the right to vote and run for office in genuine periodic elections,
to belong to a political party or to engage in protest activity. I
include however other freedoms of expression and association
under this cluster. Although these are often considered basic civil
rights, they are qualitatively different from the more basic protec-
tions implied in the foundation of the social contract and they fit
better under the rubric of participation. In sum, using the labels
of protection, provision and participation encompasses the broad4 The 3Ps categorization can also be found in some literature on children’s rights
(see Mayall, 2000). The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is
seen as providing rights of children to protection, provision and participation.
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them in ways that reflect the normative roles of states and citizens
under the social contract. However, a focus on the 3Ps alone does
not explain why certain groups of people should pay more taxes,
why compulsory conscription is sometimes warranted or why a
certain issue has become a matter of national security.
Beyond the three Ps of provision, protection and participation,
there is a fourth domain that is critical for understanding the social
contract. Legitimacy does not simply happen when the state some-
how manages to meet most of its obligations. Legitimacy is delib-
erately created and must continuously be nurtured and
maintained. Studying lived social contracts therefore necessitates
a systematic appreciation of how the dominant order is legitimized
or ‘the manufacturing of consent’ (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). At
the most basic level, a dominant ideology whether it is free enter-
prise, social democracy or religious nationalism is often delineated
in official discourses and constitutions. Official discourses continu-
ously define national security and propagate politically relevant
values on individual, religious, cultural, gender, economic and
environmental rights that justify the various parameters of protec-
tion, provision and participation. Citizens, corporations and other
entities could of course have significant scope in creating and
debating these dominant discourses. Especially in the Prison Note-
books, Gramsci (1971) elaborated the notion of hegemony to
describe how the ruling classes, especially through schools and
the media, shape and normalize the very ideas and values that
legitimize the status quo as common sense; that is, ‘hegemonic’.
The modern state has very formally adopted this role by instituting
mass education and in fact stipulating compulsory enrollment of
the nation’s children into institutions that instruct them in the
dominant language, identities and values. Citizens of most modern
states have the obligation to surrender their children to be social-
ized by the state, or institutions approved by the state.
I use the term ‘production of hegemony’ to refer to these prac-
tices that seek to create hegemony, without assuming that they
succeed in doing so. In fact, I stress the ways in which the produc-
tion of hegemony by the state can be fragmented, investment in it
inconsistent, its results unpredictable and the reproduction of its
messages among youth consequently very weak. The production
of hegemony encompasses not only the explicit articulation of
nationalist and ideological constructs, as enshrined in constitu-
tions and referenced in official rhetoric, but also the range of
strategies, activities, silences and saliences that implicitly and
explicitly legitimize the dominant order, in the media, in schools
and beyond. This includes the discourses, practices, rituals and
symbols that explain citizen and state obligations along the 3Ps
and link them to collective identity, values, history and destiny.
Beyond sending their children to state-approved schools, citizens
are sometimes officially or unofficially expected to participate in
the discursive or ritualistic production of hegemony and these
expectations are variably policed, enforced and rewarded.5 They
are also expected to observe prohibitions on certain symbols, dis-
courses and forms of organizations, such as prohibitions on Nazi,
white supremacist, anti-Semitic or jihadi practices. In sum, to under-
stand social contacts, systematic analysis is needed not only to pro-
vision and participation, but also to protection and the production of
hegemony and to the obligations of the state and the citizen in rela-
tion to each of these parameters. Diagram 1 summarizes the ele-
ments of the social contract and the state and citizen obligations
relating to each of the 4Ps.5 This ranges from small symbolic practices or observing limited prohibitions, on
burning the national flag for example, to saluting the national flag in schools, to far
more pervasive demands like participating in ruling party rallies, or displaying photos
of leaders in public spaces.
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concept of legitimacy, I am implicitly suggesting, following social
contract theory, that the success of the state in fulfilling its obliga-
tions under each of the 4Ps offers a solid indication of how its legit-
imacy is perceived. A deficit in legitimacy does not of course mean
that a regime will collapse or that citizens will risk conducting a
revolt against a repressive state. Authoritarian regimes in particu-
lar stay in power through a mix of factors including coercion, legit-
imation, cooptation, elite change and external support (Albrecht &
Schlumberger, 2004). I also do not address questions around
whether or when uprisings or instability might occur. The litera-
tures on mobilization and collective action have emphasized that
grievances should be seen as necessary but not sufficient conditions
for collective action, which is shaped by resources, networks and
opportunities (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2000, 70). This article’s
contribution is to operationalize the four elements as critical to cit-
izen grievances; thus highlighting some of the links that can be fur-
ther explored between changes in the 4Ps and the resources,
networks and opportunities that inform oppositional mobilization.6 This is especially true in the case of widespread unemployment for educated
youth and due to the association of higher levels of education with political
participation (see Campante & Chor, 2012 for an overview).
7 For more details on the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this
approach, see (Sobhy, forthcoming).3. Studying the lived social contract in education
While the overall trends along the 4Ps can provide a solid image
of the social contract, a focus on lived experiences adds critical
insights on the workings of the social contract and their impact
on different categories of citizens. In this, I am building on the lit-
erature that privileges lived experiences and everyday enactments
of citizenship (Isin, 2008). As Isin and Turner (2002, 4) explain,
contemporary citizenship theory constructs citizenship not simply
in terms of legal rights but ‘‘as a social process through which indi-
viduals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding or losing
rights”, which has led ‘‘to a sociologically informed definition of
citizenship in which the emphasis is less on legal rules and more
on norms, practices, meanings, and identities”. The notion of lived
social contracts therefore builds on the insights of the literature on
‘lived citizenship’ as ‘‘the meaning that citizenship actually has in
people’s lives and the ways in which people’s social and cultural
backgrounds and material circumstances affect their lives as citi-
zens” (Hall & Williamson, 1999, 2). The focus on lived realities
invites a qualitative inquiry that focuses on differentiated everyday
experiences and enactments of rights and duties. The analysis of
the case study below shows the depth and color that the focus
on lived experiences along each of the 4Ps can add to the overall
context. The framework could also be applied in both narrower
and broader ways, from comparisons across different historical
eras to the conditions of different subsets of the population. Here,
I use the focus on lived experience and the field of education to
demonstrate the workings of this framework and the insights it
generates.
Education is not only a component or mirror of the social con-
tract, but represents a key arena for the production of hegemony
and a key transmission belt that links the domains of social con-
tracts with regime stability. Because of its typically large size rela-
tive to the civilian state bureaucracy, the education sector mirrors
the major transformations of public institutions and their social
and political implications. It is a fairly universal modern phe-
nomenon that can be studied in any global context. The workings
of the education sector also have critical implications for develop-
ment as investments in the economic, social and political future of
a country. For these reasons, and because of its reach into every
household, education is often a key concern of citizens and govern-
ments and a key sector where international development assis-
tance is directed. In fact, this framework also offers a systematic
approach that can be easily adapted to analyzing and comparing
education systems, where instead of the mainstream emphasisPlease cite this article as: H. Sobhy, The Lived Social Contract in Schools: From p
org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104986on access, quality and equity, the elements of provision, protection,
participation and values are all integrated in one comprehensive
framework that focuses on lived realities. Education also has criti-
cal links to political developments, including instability and the
likelihood of protest.6 Above all, education informs the experiences
and values of citizens across social class and gender over an
extended period of their formative years and is therefore an ideal
site for an ethnography of lived social contracts.
The article proposes an approach that uses ethnographic study
of education to produce insights that systematically link school
realities with the broad parameters of protection, provision, partic-
ipation and legitimation in society. The theoretical and method-
ological underpinnings of this approach are shaped by the
sociology and anthropology of education that studies schools to
examine arrangements of power and legitimacy in society
(Bourdieu, 1996). Scholars such as Michael Apple and Lois Weis
have provided important insights for surpassing the more rigid
models of earlier studies, where schools were seen as vehicles for
reproducing the dominant order and class structure. Processes of
legitimation in schools are not assumed to be ‘successful’ in instill-
ing certain values and dispositions, nor in fact coherent or unified
(Apple & Weis, 1986). In this light, ethnographic programs of anal-
ysis were seen as more appropriate in aiding the understanding of
what schools actually do (Foley, Levinson, & Hurtig, 2000; Sewell &
Hauser, 1980). Scholars like Stephen Ball, Deborah Youdell and
Veronique Benei have used Foucauldian approaches to subjectiva-
tion to bring educational ethnography to bear on issues of neolib-
eralism, nationalism and gender relations. Based on these
approaches, a political ethnography of education like the one
employed here uses insights from the everyday discourses and
practices in schools to understand patterns of governance and
legitimation in society.7
The proposed approach of reading lived social contracts in
schools requires a focus on certain aspects of school relations to
capture the lived dimensions of each of the 4Ps, in addition to anal-
ysis of curricula and school activities and mapping of critical trends
in the sector. Studying the production of hegemony in schools
requires a study of texts as well as everyday rituals, discourses
and practices. It involves an examination of representations of
national identity and common values and how the dominant order
and its obligations are legitimized, what kind of investment is
placed in establishing its hegemony and how these discourses
are enacted, received or resisted by young people. In terms of par-
ticipation, the focus is on the rights and freedoms reflected in
everyday forms of representation, organization and expression
available to students and teachers, from exam questions and wall
journals to student elections and forms of independent unioniza-
tion of teachers. In authoritarian states, looking through the lens
of education shifts the focus to how everyday deviations from
the dominant script are policed, punished or overlooked and the
classed and gendered repression and censorship that touch the
lives of wide segments of society, not to the repression targeted
at activists and political opponents. Education can of course reflect
in rich detail the provision component of the social contract: the
reach of public services, their quality, the scale of gendered, regio-
nal and religious inequalities, as well as major patterns in the man-
agement of the sector that shape opportunities for welfare. This is
done by mapping overall trends in the sector as well as appreciat-
ing their everyday manifestation in schools. Finally, examining the
domain of protection in schools provides a solid idea of the reach ofrotection to the production of hegemony, World Development, https://doi.
Diagram 1. The elements of the 4Ps framework of social contracts.
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regulations, equal access to means of redress, issues around petty
corruption and the protection of students from physical and
emotional harm. Finally, the overall context in a society and the
specific issues it struggles with will fine-tune the focus of these
inquiries.8
4. Background: the 4Ps in Egypt
Before going to the ethnographic detail, this section offers
essential background on the case of Egypt by charting the major
overall patterns relating to the 4Ps. Egypt was one of the key cases
used in the literature on Arab social contracts pioneered by leading
Middle East scholars like Raymond Hinnebusch and Steve Heyde-
man. These foundational works describe the wide range of benefits
provided to citizens, the denial of participation rights and the
hegemony enjoyed by the postcolonial regime. Egypt is also an
example of the shift from the welfarist social contract under Nasser
(1950s–1970s) to a crony capitalist arrangement corresponding to
changes in the post-1980 global order under Sadat and Mubarak,
stemming especially from Washington Consensus policies
(Hinnebusch, 2020; Heydemann, 2020). Some of the subsequent
changes in the late Mubarak era (2003–2011) are well documented
in terms of a crony neoliberal turn that started with structural8 In this study, I focus on rights that would seem basic and taken for granted in
other societies, where studies would focus on finer points and the reach of rights to
specific disadvantaged populations. For example, whereas I refer to normalized
physical and emotional punishment, studies in the global North, where prohibitions
on corporal punishment are largely observed, have assessed the ways in which
students of color or those with disabilities are more likely to receive severe forms of
school discipline and therefore do not enjoy the same levels of protection as their
peers (see Cameron, 2006).
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loans—typically signed after waves of arms purchases (Mitchell,
2012). These patterns have undergone critical ruptures, reversals
and intensifications since the uprising of 2011. That cycle of mass
mobilization brought about the removal of Mubarak and the rela-
tively free elections that led to the one-year presidency of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi, who was removed by the
military in 2013 paving the way for the current presidency of
Abdulfattah al-Sisi.
The scale and nature of the withdrawal of protection in Egypt
goes beyond notions of neoliberal cronyism, and extends to a kind
of generalization of corruption and informality that amounts to a
breakdown of the rule of law. This is more vivid in the ethno-
graphic discussion below, but some indicators could begin to intro-
duce the overall picture. Egypt ranks very low on indicators of
corruption and in 2018 ranked close to the bottom of a measure
of the rule of law, and cronyism is a prominent feature of key
spheres like industrial policy (El-Haddad, 2020).9 In addition, the
size of the informal sector in Egypt, where workers have no legal
protections, has been continuously increasing from the 1980s until
the present; currently representing up to 70% of the economic
activity (AfDB, 2016; Elshamy, 2018; OECD, 2018). This retraction
of the rule of law is a result of an increasing impoverishment and
‘securitization’ of the police and judiciary. The overall transformation
since the late Mubarak era is broadly conceived as re-direction of the9 According to Transparency International, Egypt’s 2017 score of 32 in perceptions
of public sector corruption puts its rank at 117 out of 180 countries. This is similar to
its pre-2011 rankings on the same indicator (Alissa, 2007). Egypt ranked 110 out of
113 nations in a 2018 report on perceptions of how the rule of law is applied in a host
of areas including the justice system, regulatory enforcement, security issues,
fundamental rights, government powers, and corruption (WJP, 2018).
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away from the regular functions of public security. This is translated
in the sense of diminished access to policing functions for the poor,
with the revival of communal arbitration methods and reliance on
private security for those who can afford it (see Ismail, 2006, 2012).
In terms of the protection of national security, a slow and steady
deterioration under Mubarak was guided by considerations of
guarding regime security rather than the national interest
(Shama, 2013). In the past few years, there have been three major
changes that reflect the retraction of this fundamental form of pro-
tection: the hasty transfer of sovereignty over strategic Red Sea
islands to the regime’s biggest regional alley, Saudi Arabia; the
uncontained Jihadi insurgency in Sinai and the imminent threat
to Egypt’s access to Nile water due to the management of conflicts
over water resources with neighboring countries. There have been
significant changes in relation to citizen duties in relation to pro-
tection. Compulsory military service was a critical component of
the postcolonial social contract and its legitimation centered on
the army’s role in the removal of the monarchy, ending British
occupation and fending off the 1956 tri-partite aggression and
responding to Israeli occupation in the 1973 war. The subsequent
signing of the peace treaty with Israel was not accompanied by
wide scale de-mobilization, but rather to the expansion of the role
of the army in the economy, which arguably informs perceptions of
conscription among Egyptians (Abul-Magd, 2014; Sayigh, 2012).
In terms of provision, the privatization and reduced quality of a
wide range of services, along with reduced social rights and poor
economic management, have affected most sectors of society. Suc-
cessive cuts to energy, food and water subsidies as well as social
health and pension insurance all lowered living standards
(Vidican-Auktor & Loewe, 2020). From 2015 to 2018, the number
of people living under the (very low) poverty line of 735 EGP (43
USD)/month rose from 20 million to 31 million people (from
27.8% to 32.5% of the population) (Saleh, 2019). Official youth
unemployment rates have almost doubled over the period from
the 1990s to the present and now range from 30 to 35 per cent
(World Bank, 2019; ILOSTAT, 2019). There is no unemployment
insurance to speak of and other welfare provisions for poverty, dis-
ability, sickness or old age are limited in adequacy and coverage
(Vidican-Auktor and Loewe, 2020). Citizens are therefore essen-
tially obliged to access basic services privately or by resorting to
(religious) charities. This has contributed to widening wealth and
spending gaps (CAPMAS, 2017; Diab, 2016). The tax burden borne
by citizens is inequitable and lacking in transparency due to infor-
mality and tax evasion. The tax rate is low and not progressive and
therefore most of the tax and social insurance burden is borne by
the formally employed.10 As it was before 2011, taxing the rich
was not the solution to compensating for reduced spending on pub-
lic services and Egypt’s tax-to-GDP ratio has been decreasing since
2002 (OECD, 2018).11
Limits on political participation and freedom of expression were
already a key component of the postcolonial social contract. The
late Mubarak era saw a measure of political liberalization that con-
tributed to the growth of social movements culminating in the
uprisings. Since 2014, the war on terror and the turbulent regional
context have been used to legitimize a range of measures that
undermine almost every area of expression, representation, organi-
zation and associational life and have produced tens of thousands
of political prisoners (Hamzawy, 2017; Rutherford, 2018). In terms10 In 2005, a major tax ‘reform’ effectively removed any semblance of progressive
taxation, capping all taxes at 20 percent (Diab, 2016).
11 The income tax rate for the highest earners was briefly raised to 30 percent in the
aftermath of the 2011 Revolution, but was revised down to 22.5 percent in August
2015 and a ten percent tax on income for stock trading introduced after the
Revolution was suspended within months of being introduced.
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have used different discourses and narratives to legitimize these
realities. These narratives were dominated by championing social
justice, anti-imperialism and ending British occupation under Nas-
ser (1954–70). With economic liberalization under Sadat (1970–
81) and the shift in alliances from the Soviet Union to the United
States, official references to the declared principles of social justice,
anti-imperialism and Arab nationalism progressively declined. By
2007, the Constitution was finally purged of references to socialism
and replaced with the declaration that ‘‘the economy of the Arab
Republic of Egypt is founded on the development of the spirit of
enterprise.” Sadat’s legitimacy was significantly constructed
around ending the Israeli occupation of the Sinai and Mubarak
tried to draw on some of this legitimacy by emphasizing his role
as a senior officer in 1973, but in later years the focus had already
shifted to fighting Islamist terrorism. The legitimation shifts of the
regime did not only relate to economic ideology and regional con-
flict, but critically to the use of religion. Sadat promoted Islam at
the center of moral and political identity, primarily to compete
with the popularity of Nasser’s secular Arab Socialism. Different
phases under Mubarak were characterized by lenience with violent
groups, limitations on politicized groups, empowerment of non-
oppositional Salafi groups and the promotion of de-politicized
evangelical and charitable piety (Roussillon 1998; Sobhy, 2009).
The current regime has had a far more violent relationship with
oppositional Islamists, purging the Muslim Brotherhood from
political life and fighting a protracted insurgency in Sinai, but the
reliance on Salafi groups and non-oppositional piety has not lost
its appeal. The following sections bring in the results of the ethno-
graphic research on how these overall trends are manifested in
everyday lived experiences. However, instead of starting with pro-
tection however, discussing patterns of lived provision, coupled
with some hard facts on the sector, serves to better contextualize
the setting.5. Provision: disinvestment, privatization and clientelistic
mismanagement
Egyptian public education was especially renowned for its high
quality until the 1970s. Paralleling trends in other public services,
it has witnessed remarkable deterioration since then. In terms of
quantitative indicators, it should be noted however that official
school enrolment figures have been improving over the past dec-
ades. The official primary enrollment rate has now reached about
95% in a truly massive system where close to twenty-two million
students are enrolled (MOE, 2018). However, while the numbers
may indicate that access to education is rising, quality and equity
have been declining so rapidly as to render such access meaning-
less. The results of a 2010 national standardized examination in
Arabic, science and mathematics showed that average student
scores were less than 50%, with large variations within the system
(MOE, 2014, 63). In the 2007 TIMSS international ranking, 53% of
Egyptian 8th grade students did not satisfy the low international
benchmark in Mathematics and 45% were below the lower bench-
mark in Science (UNICEF, 2015, 39). This was already 5% lower than
Egypt’s 2003 scores (MOE, 2007, 46) and Egypt has not taken part
in the test since then. Confirming the progressive deterioration of
learning in the system, Egypt’s rank in the international examina-
tion for Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) in
2016 was the second lowest in the world.
These changes affected social segments differently creating a
more fragmented and unequal social contract. The overall low per-
formance is coupled with one of the highest rates of disparity in
the region (Ersado and Gignoux 2014). The divergent realities in
the three types of secondary schools where I conducted myrotection to the production of hegemony, World Development, https://doi.
14 The greatest allocations seem to go to strategic governorates where unrest might
be possible and are in a sense granted to ‘important’ or strategic governors to allow
them to expand their clientelistic networks.
15 According to a leading Egyptian education researcher, until the 1970s, a
preparatory school teacher’s salary was EGP 18 and at the time, a gram of 18c gold
was worth 81 piasters, so the salary was equivalent to 22 g of gold. To have an
H. Sobhy /World Development xxx (xxxx) xxx 7research: Technical, Public General and Private General is meant to
capture these differences that reflect the quality and achievement
gaps in lower grades (Ersado and Gignoux, 2014). When I started
my fieldwork, technical schools enrolled 56% of the students who
continued from preparatory to secondary education, public general
schools enrolled 33%, religious Azhar schools enrolled 8% and pri-
vate general schools enrolled less than 3% of students (MOE,
2007), less than half of whom enroll in English language schools
like the private schools I studied. For the majority in technical edu-
cation, even official reports admit that most schools lack basic
equipment, maintenance, teachers and technicians and that tech-
nical education is inadequate for meeting the needs of society
and of internal and external labor markets (MOE, 2007, 278,
Annexes 106). Although students in the general track are a more
privileged group, they suffer from outdated and stifling curricula,
instruction and assessment methods, rising costs in terms of pri-
vate tutoring and low returns in terms of high unemployment
(MOE, 2007). Private general secondary students represent the
intellectual and financial elite of the country, who have better
chances at securing places in coveted university faculties and for-
mal employment, but must endure the same poor educational pro-
grams and more expensive tutoring in addition to their private
schools fees.
Beyond numbers and figures, perhaps one example from the
classes I attended can show some of the concrete translations of
these trends. This computer science class in the girls’ technical
school proceeded in what came to be a familiar fashion. First, the
teacher wrote the date, subject and title of the lesson ‘Inserting
Symbols’ on the blackboard and spent some time directing casual
insults at the students. Second, the teacher recited the following
four sentences: 1) to insert a symbol, place the cursor where the
symbol is to be inserted; 2) open the ‘‘Insert” dialogue box; 3)
select the symbol and choose the command ‘‘insert;” and 4) note
that operations applicable to normal text are applicable to sym-
bols, like changing the size of the font or highlighting the symbol.
The rest of the class time was spent on mechanical repetitions of
these four sentences. First, students were asked to repeat each sen-
tence after the teacher. Then, she dictated the sentences to them,
stopping and repeating herself several times, as the students wrote
them out in their notebooks. Finally, she dictated a homework
question—and a frequent exam question—to the students: ‘‘what
are the steps of inserting a symbol?” She then asked for the atten-
dance sheet, counted the students, signed it and said that she
would look at the notebooks next class to check each student’s
notes. The class ended. This was a third secondary class. There
were no computers in the classroom. The lesson was one of a series
of six lessons on the ‘‘Insert” function.12 The learning conditions are
certainly far better in general secondary schools and even better in
private schools, but problems with assessment, rote learning and
poorly developed curricula are common across the system.13 These
realities contribute to very poor economic integration of youth, in
light of poor skills, very high informality and limited employment
opportunities.
The three key mechanisms that have perpetuated this decline in
provision are decreased public spending and real wages, formal12 The content of this lesson, the way it was delivered, the way it would be
examined and the ‘knowledge’ and ‘skills’ it was meant to impart show just what kind
of education is available in Egypt’s technical schools (where 50 to 70% of secondary
school students have enrolled over the previous decades). Students are never given
assignments requiring computer use in the first place and are not really allowed to
use the computers at the school. The class time is very short because this school is a
double shift school, where class times are shortened to allow two school populations
to use the same building.
13 By 2020, the distribution of secondary students had shifted somewhat with lower
enrolment in the low quality technical secondary versus general secondary but more
than doubling of enrolment in private general secondary (Sobhy, forthcoming).
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for clientelistic ends. Public spending on education in Egypt is low
by international and regional standards and has been declining
since 2000 (UNESCO, 2009; OECD, 2015). Average spending repre-
sented only 2.6% of GDP from 2009 to 2014, about half of the aver-
age OECD rate (OECD, 2015, 174). The numbers looks worse when
we take into account the size of Egypt’s education system because
spending on education per student in Egypt amounts to about 1100
USD PPP, while the OECD average is about 8500. Additionally,
spending is very poorly targeted at improving either quality or
equity. The ratio of spending per student in higher education rela-
tive to pre-university education, at 3.2, is almost three time that of
OECD countries (Assaad, 2010) and the allocation of regional bud-
gets is not based on socioeconomic or equity considerations (MOE,
2010; OECD, 2015, 88).14 In fact, instead of building schools in
underprivileged areas, existing schools were converted into a multi-
ple shift system that deprives two thirds of Egypt’s students of learn-
ing and holistic development opportunities (Sobhy, 2019). The plans
announced in 2018 for the introduction, in the very same year, of ‘a
new education system’ for Egypt were in fact accompanied by a
decrease in spending. The budget allocated to pre-university educa-
tion for 2018/2019 represented only 1.4% of total GDP, dropping by a
significant 0.3% from the previous year (MOF, 2018). The most trou-
bling and critical implication of decreased spending is very low and
inequitably distributed wages. The average salary of an Egyptian tea-
cher has dramatically decreased in real terms, likely representing
less than one fifth of its value in the 1970s.15 Based on available fig-
ures, the average monthly salary of a permanent teacher can be esti-
mated at about 2725 EGP or 152 USD.16
This diminished spending and low wages are key drivers of the
highly inequitable informal privatization that has become a defin-
ing feature of education and of other public services in Egypt.
Low pay drove teachers to supplement their incomes through pri-
vate tutoring, where they must coerce their own students to take
private lessons with them.17 This has contributed to a de-facto
informal privatization of education (Sobhy, 2012), creating increas-
ingly inequitable conditions.18 The prevalence of tutoring has been
increasing over time across all levels (Sieverding, Krafft, &
Elbadawy, 2020) and substantially contributes to unequal learning
outcomes (Ersado & Gignoux, 2014). The equity implications of this
kind of privatization are relevant to teachers as much as to students,
as reflected in the vast differences in the income teachers make from
tutoring, based on the subjects they teach, the educational stage and
the income levels in the districts in which they teach. In one official
survey, only 1% of teachers in the basic education stage reported
making monthly income between 10 and 15,000 EGP; i.e. close to
teacher salaries in the 1970s (CAPMAS, 2014). These trends of
extreme informal income polarization have their parallels acrossequivalent salary today, teachers should earn 12,000 or 13,000 EGP (Personal
Interview, September 2017).
16 This estimate is calculated based on the latest officially released Salary Table of
2014 and the numbers of public teachers as per the 2017/8 MOE Statistical Yearbook
(Ch 4). The USD amount is based on the exchange rate of 17.9 EGP for the dollar in
November 2018. Current nominal salaries might be higher but real salaries are lower
than these dollar amounts due to continuous waves of currency devaluation and
inflation.
17 A recent nationwide survey has shown that almost 70% of students enroll in
private tutoring with their own teachers (ELMPS, 2012).
18 Analysis conducted by the World Bank suggests more than a quarter of learning
outcome inequality in Egypt is attributable to circumstances such as socioeconomic
background and place of birth (Ersado & Gignoux, 2014).
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Furthermore, the securitized nature of the social contract is
reflected in the increases in teacher wages in recent decades. The
significant increase in 2006 (Teacher’s Cadre) as well as the 2014
increase were exclusive to teachers as a massive educated work
force able to threaten to strike. However, the state attempted to
only include the most vocal higher status teachers. For example,
technical education teachers were excluded from the 2006 pay
increase, until they organized protests and sued for their inclusion
in the Cadre; displaying their capacity to disrupt regime security.
Furthermore, a large proportion of teachers were simply not hired
on the official pay scale, but rather on precarious and very poorly
paid temporary contracts.19 These temporary teachers were dispro-
portionately allocated to rural and poor areas, to lower educational
stages and to technical rather than general secondary; further con-
tributing to low unequal quality. After 2011, following protest and
strikes by teachers, teacher pay increased in 2012 (along with other
public sector employees) and again in 2014, and more than 100,000
temporary teachers were transferred to regular employment status.
However, these increases were largely eroded by subsequent waves
of inflation and annual increases since then have not compensated
for the drop in real wages. Other sectors like the judiciary, the army
and the police that are seen since 2014 as especially sensitive for
safeguarding the regime’s security have received unprecedented
increases in salaries, benefits and privileges above their existing
ones.20
The mismanagement of resources in the system is critically dri-
ven by the desire to distribute clientelistic benefits and other prof-
its to strategic actors, regardless of the effect on the quality of the
service or considerations of equity. This can be seen in the liberties
granted to the tutoring and private textbook industries (Sobhy,
2012), the mismanagement of human resource deployment creat-
ing vast simultaneous shortages and surpluses (MOE, 2014, pp. 65–
68) and the failings and inefficiencies of school construction
(Sobhy, 2019). After 2011, trends in the mismanagement of the
sector have also seen little change including the expansion of
employment, without a clear return on quality in a huge system
of 1.85 million employees. 21A large wave of teacher hiring in
2015 (of about 30,000 teachers) ended up with teachers placed in
locations where they were not needed and did little to alleviate a cri-
sis of teacher shortages across the country (Al-Bayali, 2018). In terms
of the social right of education and its management, the image of the
quality, equity and opportunity offered by this public service reflects
the overall decline of provision in Egypt.
6. Protection: retraction of the rule of law and gendered
violence
While the disintegration of provision is critical for understand-
ing the evolving social contract, it is the domain of protection that
is most understudied and under theorized. I argue that this is the
area where there have the greatest changes and the most critical
ones for regime legitimacy and for lived citizenship. These changes
touch every dimension of state and citizen roles in relation to pro-
tection (see Diagram 1), with wide ranging implications for every-
day experiences of lived citizenship. In fact, the collapse of state19 In 2010, it was estimated that the proportion of teachers on non-permanent
contracts had risen to around 45% (OECD, 2015, 47).
20 Accurate figures on public sector wages are not easy to obtain and net salaries,
bonuses and benefits difficult to estimate. But to give one example, among their
special bonuses, judges receive a monthly ‘infection compensation’ (which is meant
to help cover additional heath expenses resulting from illnesses contracted on the
job) of 167 USD (3000 EGP), while doctors receive about 1 USD (19 EGP).
21 Teachers constitute 53% of about 1.85 million employees in MOE as reported in
Al-Watan Newspaper on 30 March 2017.
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of administrative and legal controls involving the chipping away
at the very notion of the rule of law.
The withdrawal of rights to protection in schools is especially
crystallized in two key phenomena: the disintegration of the regu-
lar functioning of schools and normalized physical and emotional
punishment. First, the lax application of a host of rules and regula-
tions extends to every aspect of school functioning, including
enforcing student and teacher attendance, school codes on uni-
form, the implementation of any of a host of mandated activities,
the protection of the integrity of examinations and whether teach-
ers actually teach even if they enter the classroom. It touches every
aspect of the functioning of the school as a disciplinary institution
that observes, categorizes and examines (Sobhy, forthcoming). The
stripping down of protection rights is critical to permitting the
kind of perverse informal privatization practiced in the system.
Before and after 2011, teachers had the freedom to exert different
forms of pressure on students, including simply not carrying out
instruction in the classroom, discriminating against students who
do not enroll in tutoring, offering good grades and examination
assistance only to tutees and using physical and emotional vio-
lence to intimidate students to enroll in tutoring. In the boys’ tech-
nical school, attendance was around 50% in most classes and often
reached about 10% in general schools, where students overwhelm-
ingly depend on private tutoring. As occurs across the state
bureaucracy, this retraction of the rule of law is designed to enable
some citizens to extract resources denied by the state (adequate
wages) from other citizens. The relaxing of protections is rein-
forced by citizens themselves as they carve out spaces of laxity
and informality that allow them to survive under these conditions,
in a way similar to what Bayat (2010) described as the nonmove-
ment of the poor.
If such dysfunction of a public institution is difficult to imagine,
the phenomenon of normalized cheating can demonstrate this
kind of institutional breakdown. It brilliantly reveals the break-
down of the rule of law, its reasons and how it impacts different
segments of society. Students in the technical schools were mostly
transparent regarding the extent to which they rely on cheating to
pass their exams. That is, they rely on enrolling in tutoring with the
class teacher who coaches them on exam questions or simply pro-
vides them with answers during the exam or otherwise attempt to
secure model answers for frequently occurring questions. Further-
more, according to school administrators, acceptable ‘pass rates’
for each cohort are effectively imposed on schools, so that if they
report lower rates, they are either penalized or simply instructed
to raise the grades so as to have a higher pass rate (and less grade
repetition and backlog in the system). If this level of normalized
cheating seems difficult to imagine, one could refer to a 2014 offi-
cial report that revealed that over 35% of preparatory stage stu-
dents cannot read and write (MOE, 2014, 63). This is already a
gross underestimation as evidenced by Egypt’s second to last rank-
ing the 2016 international literacy exam (PRILS). With such poor
literacy, the only way students could pass from one year to the
next over eight years of schooling is through different forms of sys-
tematically tolerated cheating and automatic transition. From the
perspective of students, if the system provides such little actual
service/learning, then cheating is an appropriate response to avoid
the further loss of status that would stem from withdrawal from
schooling: A commonly repeated statement by technical school
students described the prevailing system as: ’you pay, you pass;
you cheat, you get a good grade’.
These patterns of normalized extralegality and complicity do
not apply in the same way to the more privileged middle classes.
General secondary and private school students do not experience
such normalized cheating. Student grades in general secondary
are fundamental for accessing subsidized higher education androtection to the production of hegemony, World Development, https://doi.
22 For the youngest students, according to a 2012 survey, 80% of respondents said
that students in their primary school were subject to physical punishment, more than
half saying that this occurred either daily or frequently (ELMPS, 2012). The percentage
is somewhat lower for preparatory schools with 70% of respondents reporting regular
physical punishment in their schools and even lower in secondary schools with 30%
saying there was regular physical punishment and 50% saying students are never
beaten (ELMPS, 2012).
23 Formal educational attainment is the main criteria for determining the period of
conscription (from one to three years), the types of posts and their location and,
informally, the kind of treatment young men can expect to receive. Exemptions for
entire cohorts of university graduates were common in the late Mubarak era.
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of fairness of this critical bottleneck of social mobility for the mid-
dle classes. Therefore, issues around national examinations and
cheating in general secondary exams become highly politicized
and are discussed in the media every year, in stark contrast to
the silence on normalized cheating in the technical track. This
points once more to a securitized fragmented social contract,
where the state only extends its protection so far as to offer the
middle classes fairer chances of social mobility through access to
the right to fair assessment, and consequently to subsidized uni-
versity education. But even this level of protection to the middle
classes has been undermined in recent years through further frag-
mentation and withdrawal of protection. Media reports about spe-
cial examination conditions for students from elite families began
to emerge on a small scale in the late Mubarak era and have only
multiplied in recent years. While such cases are discussed cau-
tiously in the state-controlled media, among students, the exis-
tence of ‘VIP examination halls’ and the payments that can be
made to obtain exam questions and model answers are a regular
topic of discussion. This provides additional justifications for stu-
dents to cheat and deepens their sense of inequality and exclusion.
The second manifestation of the loss of protection is the painful
reality of physical and emotional punishment to which students
are subjected. The level of beating and humiliation in Egypt’s
schools is seen as unprecedented compared to earlier decades. In
the late 1990s, around 80% of the boys and 60% of the girls in
one study reported being beaten by teachers with the use of hands,
sticks, straps, shoes and kicking (Youssef, Attia, & Kamel, 1998).
About a decade later, a study by the National Center for Social
and Criminal Research (NCSCR) showed that 91% of noncompliant
students experienced violent punishment (Yunus, 2009). As with
nominal expansion of educational enrollment and nominal teacher
attendance, there is a nominal expansion of protection over the
same period. Official regulations definitively protect students from
beating and humiliation, regular instructions to teachers indicate
that ‘physical and emotional punishment’ is strictly forbidden
and a 2008 law went further to criminalize beating.
The everyday realities in the public schools confirm these pat-
terns and show the ways in which they are classed and gendered.
The use of physical and verbal punishment ranges from severe to
mild based on social class and gender. Boys in technical schools
(working class young men) suffered the most verbal and physical
violence (being slapped on the face, beaten harshly or humiliated
using obscene curse words), even in my presence, followed by boys
in general schools. In the striking statement of a student in the
boys’ technical school: ‘There is no education in the first place...
The teacher comes in, beats the guys around a little and leaves.’
Public school teachers were fully aware that they could beat stu-
dents with impunity and that students had no effective access to
redress, whether through the school administration or through
the police. As a teacher in the boys’ general school told me: ‘‘You
see me: I come in with a stick and a hose. I beat and I scold but they
accept it. . . If not, I tell them here is the local police station, go
complain if you want.” The forms of punishment directed at girls
in the technical and general schools were decidedly less severe
and less corporal, but the pattern was still one of normalized
extralegal punishment. As a student in the girls’ technical school
put it, ‘they always hit and never talk gently... They talk with their
hands or hit with the stick’. Furthermore, in both technical schools,
students were often forced to clean the labs and perform other
chores in the school. Reduced and privatized access to public safety
was manifested in the failed struggles of public school actors to
provide minimal levels of protection to girls and boys in the imme-
diate vicinity of schools from sexual harassment or drug dealing, as
well as within school premises, from health and safety hazards,
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My post-2011 interviews point to a greater assertiveness on the
part of students in rejecting physical and emotional punishment
that serves to put some limits on these practices, especially for
the older secondary school students. While this level of normalized
punishment is already troubling, the level emotional and physical
violence I witnessed is arguably doubled or tripled for younger stu-
dents less capable of defending themselves.22 However, physical
and emotional punishment of students is by no means unique to
Egyptian schools and is common in other countries of the global
South, although it is very difficult to compare its intensity (see
Pinheiro, 2006). On the other hand, boys and girls in private schools
were not systematically beaten or humiliated and students and
teachers alike explicitly rejected the kinds of punishment prevalent
in public schools.
While I deal elsewhere with the various issues around discipline
and punishment in schools (Sobhy, forthcoming), it is important to
note that the forms of punishment pervading Egyptian schools are
less an expression of culturally sanctioned child rearing practices
among the poor than the result of the deliberate negligence of
the weak privatized state. The harsh style of punishment adminis-
tered on students, including humiliation and rebuke, is essentially
applied to teachers themselves (Naguib, 2006). To give one exam-
ple, if teachers are harshly rebuked for classroom cleanliness, while
insufficient cleaning staff are employed, they have an incentive to
force students to perform such tasks and to intimidate them for not
revealing these practices. Harsh punishment, usually framed as a
response to some other infraction, can be helpful in pressuring
those students who had not yet enrolled in tutoring, especially in
the lower grades as well as in technical schools. Last but not least,
resorting to harsh punishment is not separate from the frustration
of their low pay, status and autonomy, with overcrowded class-
rooms and poor resources and with the stress and fatigue of having
to earn their living through working additional hours of private
tutoring or other jobs. I therefore emphasize how the retraction
of provision goes hand in hand with the forms of punishment in
the schools: the use of continuous negative labeling, physical
intimidation and repression of contestation.
I have often wondered why young people do not simply aban-
don schools if they offer such poor learning and such poor treat-
ment. In fact, high rates of unemployment and
underemployment disproportionately affect educated youth and
it is clear that the returns to education are decreasing (Assaad &
Krafft, 2014). Male students however often referenced military ser-
vice when explaining why they continued to enrolled in schooling.
Compulsory military service for young men represents at the very
least a loss of time, potential income and professional experience
at the onset of the entrepreneurial and professional careers. For
the majority of less privileged young men, it arguably represents
an endurance of considerable emotional, physical and financial
stress.23 Withdrawal from formal education would therefore repre-
sent not only a loss of social status, but implies a very profound
change in the conditions facing young men. Better marriage pro-
spects and the increased freedoms outside the household during
school enrollment were key factors for girls. Many young peoplerotection to the production of hegemony, World Development, https://doi.
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realization of the poor value of education.24 Past textbooks can be requested from the Ministry of Education archives. All
translations from textbook excerpts are my own.7. Participation: surveillance, impoverishment and Islamization
It might not be surprising that these widespread infringements
on protection and provision were accompanied by strict limits on
various forms of expression, organization, association and repre-
sentation. The restrictions on participation were driven by state
surveillance, deepened through the impoverishment of schools
and accompanied by wide ranging forms of Islamization. This secu-
ritization of education is reflected in various controls on all actors
in the schools. Various levels and modes of surveillance are in place
to ensure that all school discourses—including exam questions and
student answers—are devoid of oppositional themes, especially
under the banner of combating extremism and terrorism. State
Security affiliated political communication representatives are
reportedly represented in every educational district to monitor
teachers and receive any reports by supervisors about oppositional
discourses in the classrooms. The broader limitations on labor
organization are also applied to teachers, whereby their rights to
protest and organize or create independent unions are continu-
ously undermined. The principal forms of ‘representation’ allowed
is that of the official Educational Professions Syndicate, which is
not only coopted and controlled by the state, but in fact officially
headed by the Minister of Education (Social Justice Platform,
2018). With such overwhelming limits, many subtleties of partici-
pation that could be explored in other settings are absent from the
Egyptian case.
It remains critical to note that the limited participation is not
only the result of limitations on forms of expression, but also of
the impoverishment of schools, the general weakening of the state
bureaucracy and political calculations about the utility of partici-
patory education. Although they are encouraged in theory, struc-
tures such as school clubs, student unions or any semblance of
associational activity were effectively absent from the public
schools where I conducted my research. Many school activities
from debate clubs to art competitions are mandated by official reg-
ulations, but effectively exist only on paper in public schools. To
give one example, the principal entered a classroom I was attend-
ing, asked the teacher to point out the ‘good students’ and asked
them to leave the class with him so that he could present them
to school guests as the supposedly elected Student Union represen-
tatives. Most students are also deprived of subjects that are meant
to nurture talent, expression, team work, leadership, collaboration
and a more holistic social and emotional development. They are
deprived from every participatory skill or experience that could
be nurtured in school activities. This stems from four factors
directly emanating from the changing social contract. Reliance on
tutoring to secure a livelihood means that teachers of subjects that
do not count towards a student’s final score (like Sports, music or
art) must either direct their efforts to other wage-earning activities
or exit the profession. This leads to huge teacher shortages as well
as widespread patterns of (largely undocumented) teacher absen-
teeism. The second reason is that most students enroll in multiple
shift schools, where the curriculum is abridged and ‘less essential’
subjects are removed. Third, the state simply fails to provide
schools with the minimum resources needed to carry out essential
activities. Fourth, the regime may have developed a conviction that
Egypt’s relatively vibrant public schools in the 1950s and 1960s
equipped a generation of youth with oratory, organizational and
leadership skills, as well as an ideological training in Arab nation-
alism and socialism, which the student movement in the 1970s put
to use to oppose the regime.Please cite this article as: H. Sobhy, The Lived Social Contract in Schools: From p
org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104986Finally, apart from echoing the official line, the spaces of expres-
sion and participation found in schools were disproportionately
occupied by religious themes. Actual activities in the schools ran-
ged from Quran memorization contests to school radio programs
saturated with religious content. Different religious themes were
expressed on wall magazines and artwork in the different public
schools. As highlighted at the onset, since Sadat the regime has
been willing to give considerable space in the cultural sphere to
Islamist forces that are seen as less oppositional. The observation
that conservative, non-oppositional mainstream Muslim piety is
one of the few areas where activities or forms of participation
are tolerated is of course not accidental and is fundamental to
the strategies and contradictions of the production of hegemony.8. The production of hegemony: Nationalism, Islamism and
Neoliberalism
These changes to protection, provision and participation had to
be legitimized in official textbooks and everyday school rituals. In
terms of textbook, defense of the nation against continuous foreign
threats, the role of the army in protecting the nation and the duty
of love and sacrifice for the nation were consistently emphasized in
textbooks before and after 2011. The focus on defense of the nation
is especially critical for legitimizing the drafting of young men into
the army. Textbooks consistently highlighted the duty to fight and
sacrifice for the nation. Such duty was often couched and legit-
imized in religious terms. In fact, secondary school textbooks often
tackle nationalist themes, social values and even science through
Islamist and Islamic frames of reference. For example, one National
Education textbook defines the ‘good citizen’ as the one who
adheres to religious teaching and improves his personal conduct
for the elevation of the nation through ‘science and faith’.24 Two
different Arabic Language textbooks explained justice as stemming
essentially from Islam and as ‘governing by what God has decreed
(not the law, the constitution or upholding rights). The centrality
of Islam in nationalist and citizenship discourses represents a clear
exclusion of Egypt’s Christian population, but the textbooks go even
further in obscuring the richness and complexity of Egyptian, Arab
and Muslim intellectual heritage and history and in largely ignoring
the history, contributions and struggles of non-Muslim civilizations
(Sobhy, 2015). As highlighted at the onset, Islamization was part of
the legitimizing narratives since the 1970s, despite the battles with
radical Islamists. The repression that the regimes periodically
unleashed on Islamists was ‘‘tempered by willingness to permit
Islamization to make significant inroads into areas previously secu-
larized” (Springborg, 2003, 24).
This oscillation between repression and accommodation is well
reflected in the education sector. Education is often articulated in
Egypt ‘‘as a matter of national security”. This terminology became
especially prominent after a wave of terrorist attacks in the 1990s
and confrontations between the state and Islamist groups. This cul-
minated in a campaign to root out thousands of extremist teachers
but seems to have amounted to transferring many of them away
from the more liberal urban gaze. The discourse of education as a
matter of national security became prominent again after the
removal of the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamad Morsi in
2013, but culminated in token measures that were not followed
through, like the ‘‘intellectual security clubs” discussed below.
Neoliberalism is also part of the legitimizing narratives in text-
books, but there is little consistent investment in promoting it.
That is, while patriotic devotion and Islam are consistent recurring
themes, neoliberal and ‘active citizenship’ are tangential in com-rotection to the production of hegemony, World Development, https://doi.
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education explicitly included the notion of active citizenship; a
term that has been closely linked with ‘neoliberal’ notions of citi-
zenship, focused on adapting to a withdrawal of earlier citizenship
rights and adjustment to increasingly precarious economic condi-
tions (Kennelly & Llewellyn, 2011). However, only one of the text-
books I analyzed offers an extended articulation of these notions
through discussions of human capital, civil society and globaliza-
tion. After 2011, despite recurrent promises of a complete overhaul
of curricula—especially to ‘combat extremism’, only limited
changes were actually put in place (Attalah & Makar, 2014). The
main areas of change and contention related to whether and how
the uprising and the subsequent events are portrayed and how
the old and new regimes are discussed. While this may reflect
the political developments in the post-2011 era from a supposed
celebration and toleration of the Revolution to its demonization,
these textbooks were taught simultaneously demonstrating the
lack of a coherent narrative and the lack of minimal investment
in creating one. Adding to the incoherence and contradiction, these
politicized ‘controversial’ sections were often later removed and
related exam questions retracted following media coverage of
complaints by students and teachers.
My research with young people before and after 2011 reveals
the limited and incoherent investment in discourses and rituals
of legitimation and their weak resonances for students. Despite
the nationalist rhetoric pervading textbooks, students expressed
striking assertions of their lack of a sense of national belonging
to the country. They explicitly linked this to their assessment of
their everyday conditions especially in relation to protection and
provision. Students shared reflections like, ‘if we as a people bene-
fit from Egypt, we would love it’ and ‘why should I love it if I am
not getting my rights in the country?’ The impoverishment of
schools however equally undermines the promotion of nationalist
and citizenship rituals, activities and narratives, like the officially
mandated morning assembly, where the national anthem is sung
and the Egyptian flag is saluted. A general secondary school stu-
dent commented on the morning assembly ritual in his school as
follows:
There isn’t even a flag salutation. The flag is torn in the first place. It
doesn’t even have an eagle [the eagle in the middle of the Egyptian
flag]. Other students. . . yes they know something about Egypt. . .
There are a lot of songs about Egypt. They’re all obscene words.
They compose new songs to curse their country; that’s how much
they love it. . . they don’t love something called Egypt.
There was also no reproduction of any aspect of neoliberal cit-
izenship in their discourses. Before and after 2011, students
emphasized issues around their disentitlement to provision and
protection rights, including education, health, dignified treatment,
safety on their streets and consistently highlighted the inequality
in accessing those rights, based on socioeconomic background.
The only aspect these textbook narratives seem to have succeeded
in enforcing is the hegemony of mainstream Muslim piety, whose
tenants were implicitly and explicitly upheld by most students and
teachers. In fact, throughout the Mubarak era, the most visible bat-
tles around legitimation in Egyptian schools revolved around the
morning assembly ritual and the flag salutation, which school
actors often replaced or complimented with Islamic chants, instead
of the official national anthem or flag salutation (see Herrera &
Torres, 2006). Recent dynamics around legitimation relate to the
attempt to introduce a new pro-military anthem in schools, which
was often explicitly opposed by students. Reflecting the lack of
commitment in imposing its narrative, students explained that
the song was played for some time in their school, but then
stopped. Similarly, various announcements were made about ini-Please cite this article as: H. Sobhy, The Lived Social Contract in Schools: From p
org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104986tiatives like the establishment of ‘intellectual security clubs’ in
schools to nurture and monitor pro-regime narratives. However,
my research since 2016 shows that these measures were little
known and had little impact on the schools. There was little invest-
ment in establishing such clubs or following through with lectures
on religious moderation. Overall, whether on exam questions or in
the morning assembly, students and teachers critiqued, evaded
and resisted echoing the regime’s legitimizing narratives, despite
heightened fear of repression (Sobhy, forthcoming).
9. Conclusion
This article has argued for an operationalization of the notion of
social contract that builds on and expands concepts of citizenship.
It examines state and citizen obligations with reference to the four
parameters (4Ps) of protection, provision, participation and the
production of hegemony. Protection encompasses the most basic
functions of national security, access to and equality before the
law, while provision refers to social rights, public services and eco-
nomic opportunities and participation captures political rights and
freedoms. The production of hegemony relates to the discourses
and practices used to justify these obligations. For a more nuanced
appreciation of how these arrangements are lived by citizens, the
four parameters are studied through in-depth qualitative research
in a particular field. Here, the education sector is privileged as a
site where such qualitative study can yield rich integrated insights
on all key parameters. I then applied this framework to the case of
Egypt to examine the disintegration of the postcolonial welfarist
social contract and the key features of its transformations before
and after the Arab Uprisings. The trends in Egypt are not all shared
across the region in a common Arab social contract, but tools like
the 4Ps framework would enable better comparisons in the region
and beyond.
The case of Egypt reflects the impact not only of neoliberal aus-
terity and privatization, but also a creeping destruction of state
institutions, the everyday corruption involved in these dynamics
and the extent of physical and emotional violence carried out,
especially against the poor and young men, to sustain these reali-
ties. The toleration and promotion of different forms of corruption
and extralegal practices are also critical elements of the social con-
tract when they become normalized and part of the expectations of
citizens in their encounters with the state. In terms of protection,
the article highlights how informal, extralegal and illegal practices
constitute a critical component of the lived social contract of vast
segments of the population. The retraction of the rule of law is
not only nurtured by the regime, but also a process in which citi-
zens are made complicit and in which they become invested, even
if it allows them to derive only minimal benefits. This complicity
and dependence explain why citizens may prefer, nurture and
defend these arrangements over the complete exclusion that may
result from a better application of the law. In the example of sys-
tematic cheating prevalent in at least half of schools, students
become actively implicated and complicit in extralegal or corrupt
practices. Critically, they lose their moral ground and become vul-
nerable to accusations, shaming, humiliation and remain suscepti-
ble to the revocation of their unearned gains. Parallels beyond the
school appear brilliantly in the works of scholars like Singerman
(1995), Ismail (2006), Elyachar (2005) and Bayat (2010) who have
shown the dependence of the poor on webs of informal and
extralegal exchanges and their agency in nurturing and seeking
to expand these spaces. I stress therefore that it is not only political
repression, neoliberalism or cronyism that define the transforma-
tion of the social contract in Egypt, but equally the various forms
of informalization, precariarization, deregulation, institutionaliza-
tion of states of exception that amount to a selective rolling backrotection to the production of hegemony, World Development, https://doi.
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ena that I place under the broad umbrella of permissiveness in
explaining Egypt’s ‘‘permissive-repressive neoliberalism” (Sobhy,
forthcoming). So rather than focusing on a tradeoff between social
and political rights, the changing nature of protection becomes
central to the reconfiguration of the social contract and plays a crit-
ical role in the erosion of both provision and participation.
The description of the social contract as securitized and frag-
mented captures two more features of its transformation. The
divergent patterns in different tiers of schooling show the extent
of differentiation and inequality, not only in access to provision,
but also to basic protections of body and dignity. The changes in
teacher wages over the past decades demonstrate the move from
fairly homogenous entitlements to highly unequal and divisive dif-
ferentiation among public sector employees and among different
tiers of the same profession, based on both formal (although rarely
transparent) privileges, as well as access to extralegal sources of
income and privilege. These changes have been guided by a sup-
posed correspondence with considerations of regime security.
Spaces of participation and representation continue to be securi-
tized and Islamized, even if Islamist terrorism is constructed as
the primary enemy of the state. Despite the repression of different
forms of representation and organization, alternative political
forces were allowed to take over the material and symbolic func-
tions abandoned by the state. The spaces given to Islamist forces
to provide services and to propagate alternative identities and val-
ues reveal the diminished will and ability to produce hegemonic
narratives to legitimize the changing social contract. The poor
work of legitimation that results from these features is highlighted
in the everyday realities and rituals of schools and the ways in
which young Egyptians receive, reproduce and contest these real-
ities. In sum, the relationship with a wide range of social sectors
is managed through privatization, permissiveness and repression
and eased by encouraging charity and ceding spaces to Islamist
service provision and solidarity networks, while sectors critical
for regime security are provided with unprecedented privileges.
A formulation of the social contract that focuses on a tradeoff
between provision and participation might suggest that expanding
participation can compensate for the reduction of provision. This is
in fact what many Arab regimes tried before they were hit by the
uprisings. A more comprehensive conception of the social contract
suggests that its legitimacy hinges on the dynamics affecting the
parameters of protection and legitimation as well. Provision is still
a key component of this contract and when the state does not meet
its obligations on this front, it must try to compensate for the def-
icit of legitimacy. One possible strategy is that the drying up of the
funds that sustained welfare provision could be compensated for
by expanded taxation, which in turn can be better legitimized
through enhanced protection and increased participation. Regimes
could attempt to only make changes to legitimizing narratives,
especially emphasizing external threats and the need for internal
cohesion to confront them. Regimes could also nurture networks
of extralegality and corruption that create new allies and produce
complicit citizens dependent on the absence of the rule of law. The
case of Egypt shows how in states with poor resources where pro-
vision disintegrates and participation is severely constrained, the
durability of the ruling regime can hinge on a slow destruction of
the state through a retraction of the basic function of protection
and scaling down the imperatives of legitimation, while attempt-
ing to secure support and legitimation from external allies.
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